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POWER TO THE PRISONER: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF STATE RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM ACTS IN PRESERVING THE 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES OF PRISONERS 
Benjamin S. Fischer* 
INTRODUCTION 
Several states have enacted legislation restoring strict 
scrutiny1 to any law, rule or regulation that interferes with an 
individual’s free exercise of religion.2 These state Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts (“state RFRAs”) were enacted to 
replace the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”), which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in City of Boerne v. Flores.3 While these state RFRAs may 
                                                          
 *Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2002; B.A., Connecticut College, 1997. 
The author would like to thank his parents, Lynn and Jeff Fischer, and Emily 
Sollinger for their constant love and support. 
1 See infra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened 
standard of constitutional review, specifically, the compelling state interest and 
least restrictive means analysis implemented for claims of religious 
interference originally enacted under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993). 
2 ALA. CONST. amend. § 622 (2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-
1493.01 (1999); CONN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 761.03 (1998); IDAHO CODE § 73-402 (2000); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
35/15 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-
80.1-3 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-
40, 24-27-600 (2000); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 110.003 (1999). 
3 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court held that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 was unconstitutional because Congress had exceeded 
the scope of its section 5 enforcement powers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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be effective in lieu of a Federal RFRA in preserving the religious 
rights of citizens of different states, they have been ineffective in 
addressing the religious needs of prisoners. 
Recently, both houses of Congress passed the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), a 
federal law that, among other things, would restore a compelling 
interest standard and a least restrictive means analysis to any 
infringement upon a prisoner’s religious exercise of religion.4 
President Clinton signed it into law on September 22, 2000.5 This 
federal religious freedom legislation, however, will not likely 
preclude the importance of state religious freedom legislation. 
The constitutionally tenuous nature of the federal religious 
protection legislation may only provide a short life span for 
RLUIPA.6 If those states that have enacted RFRAs intend their 
legislation to play an important role in the protection of religious 
freedom of inmates, they should seek to apply their respective 
standards of review to laws and regulations that interfere with a 
prisoner’s right to free exercise. Although states have the 
potential to provide more protection to prisoners’ religious rights 
than the federal government, to date, they have not done so. 
Part I of this note will discuss the importance of religious 
freedom and the Federal RFRA, focusing on its impact on 
prisoners’ free exercise rights. Part II of this note will address 
the effectiveness of state RFRAs, concluding that current state 
RFRAs appear to be ineffective in addressing the religious rights 
of prisoners. Part II will also examine why state religious 
protection legislation is necessary despite the recent enactment of 
                                                          
Id. at 519. The Court stated that “Congress’s power under section 5 . . . 
extends only to enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . 
[Congress] has been given the power to enforce, not the power to determine 
what constitutes a constitutional violation.” Id. at 519. 
4 S. 2869, 106th Cong. (2000); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc (2000); 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1 (2000). 
5 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the 
President, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/library/hot_releases/Sept-
ember_22_2000_2.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2000). 
6 See infra Part II.A (discussing Congress’ troubles in enacting religious 
freedom legislation). 
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a federal remedy, the RLUIPA. Ultimately, this note will 
conclude that even though religious protection legislation 
currently exists for prisoners, those prisoners will ultimately need 
state religious protection legislation in order to actually preserve 
their religious liberties. 
I. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: THE FAILURE 
OF THE FEDERAL RELIGIOUS PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
A.  The Importance of Religious Freedom in America 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”7 The free 
exercise of religion is a fundamental right secured by the First 
Amendment of the Constitution.8 The importance of religious 
free exercise in American life can be traced back to the 
inhabitants of the colonies of Maryland, Rhode Island, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware and Carolina in the middle of the 
sixteenth century.9 The early colonies were often seen as 
sanctuaries for certain religious groups.10 In 1649, Maryland 
passed the Act Concerning Religion, which contained the first 
free exercise clause.11 In its colonial charter, Rhode Island 
                                                          
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
8  Id. 
9 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 551 (1997) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (providing a historical outline of religious freedom in America). 
10 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 551 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
11 Act Concerning Religion of 1649, reprinted in 5 The Founders’ 
Constitution 49, 50 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 
551 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Maryland Act provided that: 
[N]oe [sic] person . . . professing to believe in Jesus Christ shall 
from henceforth bee [sic] any waies [sic] troubled, Molested or 
discountenanced for or in respect of his or her religion not in the free 
exercise thereof . . . nor any way [be] compelled to the beleife [sic] 
or exercise of any other Religion against his or her consent, soe [sic] 
as they be not unfaithfull [sic] to the Lord Proprietary, or molest or 
conspire against the Civill [sic] Government. 
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afforded its citizens a “liberty of conscience,” which protected its 
inhabitants from being “molested, punished, disquieted or called 
into question, for any differences in opinion, in matters of 
religion.”12 Other colonies also offered religious protection with 
charters that contained similar language.13 These documents 
“suggest that, early in our country’s history, several Colonies 
acknowledged that freedom to pursue one’s chosen religious 
beliefs was an essential liberty.”14Almost one hundred years 
later, in 1789, the Federal Constitution in its Bill of Rights, and 
every state constitution except Connecticut, had adopted a free 
exercise provision.15 
In modern society, religion is a right taken very seriously not 
only by general members of the population, but also by the 
nation’s political representatives. Many politicians do not view 
religion in the abstract or even on a policy level, but instead, 
make religious traditions and practices part of their own election 
                                                          
Id. 
12 Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 1663, reprinted in 
8 W. Swindler, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS 363 (1979). 
13 See First Charter of Carolina, Art. XVIII (1663); Fundamental 
Constitutions for East New Jersey, Art. XVI (1683); Concession and 
Agreement of the Lords Proprietors of the Province of New Caesarea or New 
Jersey (1664); New York Act Declaring Rights and Privileges (1691); Laws of 
West New Jersey, Art. X (1681). 
14 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 552 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
15 THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin W. 
Wright ed., 1961). In deciding whether or not to adopt a bill of rights, there 
was much deliberation between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists. The 
Federalists believed that the rights to be protected in the Bill of Rights were 
already secure in the Constitution, and that the protection of some rights, 
might lead individuals to believe that other rights were not protected. Id. 
 Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, wanted their rights codified through 
explicit assurances that the federal government’s power in the area of personal 
liberty would be restricted mainly because of their concerns that the “Federal 
Government would overwhelm the rights of states and individuals.” Boerne, 
521 U.S. at 549. In the end, the view of the Anti-Federalists won out, and the 
protection of religious freedom along with other individual liberties made their 
way into the Federal Constitution. Id. 
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platforms and legislative agendas.16 The importance of religion 
has even united members of different political parties.17 Both 
Republicans and Democrats seem to be in agreement on the 
importance of religious rights, and members of both political 
parties have embraced the issue by enacting legislation that 
provides more protection to religious exercise than is mandated 
under the Federal Constitution.18 In addition, both civil 
libertarians and religious leaders, unlikely bedfellows, have 
joined together in the endorsement of religious protection 
legislation.19 Their union provides another indication of the broad 
                                                          
16 In the 2000 presidential race, the religious beliefs of presidential 
candidates Al Gore and George W. Bush, both born again Christians, received 
a tremendous amount of attention. Dirk Johnson, The 2000 Campaign: The 
Voters; Hearing About God but Wondering About the Issues, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 5, 2000, at A23, (stating that George W. Bush declared a “Jesus Day” 
in his state and that Al Gore, before making a decision, often asks himself, 
“What would Jesus do?”). Voters and media outlets also dedicated a 
tremendous amount of press to the religious affiliations of Joe Lieberman, the 
first Jewish vice-presidential candidate. Since his nomination, Lieberman has 
often invoked the importance of his belief in God and in his values and belief 
that more individuals would be better off if they had a stronger commitment to 
religion. Gustav Niebuhr, The 2000 Campaign: The Religion Issue; Lieberman 
Is Asked to Stop Invoking Faith in Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at 
A19. 
17 In order to provide greater protection for religious freedoms in the face 
of state or federal laws that burden religion, even against laws that appear 
neutral on their face but have the effect of burdening religion, Congress has 
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (S. 578, 103rd Cong. (1993)), 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and has debated the 
merits of the Religious Liberty Protection Act (H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. 
(1998)) for over two years. Both the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (S. 2869, 106th 
Cong. (2000)) were co-sponsored by Senators Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) and 
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), politicians usually falling on opposite ends of the 
political and ideological spectrum. S. 578, 103rd Cong. (1993). 
18 See supra note 17 (noting the recent religious protection legislation 
proposed by both major political parties). 
19 For example, both the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the 
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs wrote letters expressing their 
support for the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 
the latest legislation that protects religious rights. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 
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appeal regarding the protection of religious liberties. 
B.  The Rise and Fall of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act: Congress’ Attempt to Dignify Prisoners’ Free 
Exercise Claims 
The freedom to exercise one’s own religion is not absolute, 
especially when examined in the context of prisons.20 While 
religious liberty is a vital element of American political rights, 
prisoners are often subject to a great deal of restrictions on their 
religious exercise.21 Since prisoners are subject to twenty-four 
hour control by prison authorities, the exercise of their religious 
beliefs is often regulated; the day-to-day religious conduct of a 
prisoner generally rests in the control of others.22 A prisoner’s 
religious freedom, therefore, is a tenuous liberty. While 
prisoners retain the right of free exercise, the Supreme Court has 
developed a doctrine that affords prison officials much leeway in 
limiting the free exercise of prisoners under the First Amendment 
and significantly burdening their religious practice.23 
                                                          
S7777 (daily ed. July 27, 2000); see also 146 CONG. REC. E1563-01 (daily 
ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady) (noting that the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act was “the product of the diligent 
efforts of more than 70 religious and civil rights groups from all points on the 
political spectrum”). 
20 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (holding that an 
inmate only retains those constitutional rights not incompatible with his status 
as a prisoner). 
21 See, e.g., Pell, 417 U.S. at 822. 
22 Prisoners are “members of a ‘total institution’ that controls their daily 
existence in a way that few of us could imagine.” O’Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing E. 
Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and 
Other Inmates, 1 (1961)). Prison is a “complex of physical arrangements and 
of measures, all wholly governmental, all wholly performed by agents of 
government which determine the total existence of certain human beings . . . 
from sundown to sundown, sleeping, waking, speaking, silent working, 
playing, viewing, eating, voiding, reading, alone with others.” Morales v. 
Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Wis. 1972); see also O’Lone, 482 
U.S. at 354-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
23 O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348 (finding that a prison regulation that restricted 
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Many of the liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights apply 
with particular caution to prisoners because of the dangerous 
nature of the prison environment coupled with the state’s interest 
in rehabilitation.24 Prior to a series of restrictive Supreme Court 
cases, a prisoner’s religious rights could only be burdened by 
regulations “based upon penological concerns of the ‘highest 
order.’”25 A prisoner’s right to free exercise was tempered, 
however, in 1987 by the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz.26 The O’Lone Court held that a prisoner’s 
right to free exercise could be infringed if the infringement 
relates to a “legitimate penological interest.”27 The Court found 
that a prison restriction prohibiting Muslim inmates from 
attending weekly Jumu’ah services,28 was reasonable, not only 
                                                          
Muslim inmates from attending weekly religious services was constitutional 
because the regulation was reasonably related to “legitimate penological 
objectives”). 
24 The rights guaranteed to prisoners under the Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution have often been held by the Supreme Court to be limited in 
certain situations. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 822 (holding that an inmate only 
retains those constitutional rights not incompatible with his status as a 
prisoner); see also, Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding prison’s 
First Amendment restriction regarding inmate-to-inmate correspondence); 
Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517 (1984) (limiting an inmate’s privacy 
expectation in determining that he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his prison cell that would entitle him to Fourth Amendment protection); Jones 
v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) 
(restricting prisoners’ First Amendment freedom of association rights by 
holding that prisoners have no right to form a labor union to redress 
grievances about prison security); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 
(1976) (holding that an inmate’s Eighth Amendment medical care claim must 
prove that the person acted with “deliberate indifference”). 
25 S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 
1899 (emphasis added). 
26 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). 
27 O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 352 (holding that a prison’s prohibition against 
Muslim inmates attending a weekly Jumu’ah service in another prison building 
was constitutional because the prison had determined that weekly attendance of 
this service posed security risks and administrative burdens that prison 
officials found unacceptable). 
28 A Jumu’ah service is a weekly Muslim congregational service 
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because it related to a legitimate penological interest—in this 
case, prison safety and order—but also because the court found 
that inmates were not deprived of the “ability to participate in 
other Muslim religious ceremonies.”29 In a companion case, 
Turner v. Safley, decided a week prior to O’Lone, the Court gave 
deference to prison administrators by allowing them to restrict 
inmate-to-inmate correspondence stating, “courts are ill equipped 
to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison 
administration and reform.”30 Moreover, the court found that 
“running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that 
requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, 
all of which are peculiarly within the province of the Legislative 
and Executive Branches of Government.”31 This deferential 
standard displaced the previous “highest order” standard,32 and 
lower federal courts went on notice that they were to afford 
deference to prison officials and administrators. After the O’Lone 
decision, prisoners were forced to live with a burden placed on 
their religious freedoms, and this burden did not require a 
substantial amount of justification from those imposing it. 
A burden on religion has often proved troublesome to 
prisoners, many of whom attempt to rehabilitate themselves 
through spiritual or religious practice.33 The deference afforded 
                                                          
commanded by the Koran that “must be held every Friday after the sun 
reaches its zenith and before the Asr, or afternoon prayer.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. 
at 344; see also Koran, 62:9-10. 
29 O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 352. 
30 Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (citations omitted). 
31 Id. at 84-85. 
32 The Court established this “highest order” standard in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (stating that “only those interests of the 
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims 
to the free exercise of religion”). 
33 See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (1969) (stating that 
“[r]eligion in prison subserves the rehabilitative function by providing an area 
within which the inmate may reclaim his dignity and reassert his 
individuality”); see also O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(stating that “[t]o deny the opportunity to affirm membership in a spiritual 
community, however, may extinguish an inmate’s last source of hope for 
dignity and redemption”); Comment, Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 
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to prison officials had detracted from the religious experience of 
the prisoner, significantly limiting how a prisoner can express 
himself through religion.34 Thus, with the application of O’Lone’s 
deferential, rational basis approach to the religious rights of 
prisoners, a prisoner’s ability to use religion as an essential 
element of his rehabilitative process became quite tenuous, until 
however, Congress enacted RFRA. 
The judicially established burden on a prisoner’s right to 
freely exercise his religion began to dissipate in 1993 when 
Congress passed RFRA.35 Congress was reacting to the Supreme 
                                                          
U. PA. L. REV. 812, 853-54 (1977) (stating that an “inmate’s conscience is no 
less inviolable than that of an unconfined citizen, and a violation could well 
work an even greater harm upon the inmate, whose means of spiritual 
recovery are limited by the prison environment”). 
34 The deference afforded to prison officials in matters of religious 
observance has provided the requisite authority for prison officials to deny 
inmates the right to perform many of the most basic and meaningful religious 
practices. See Rich v. Woodford, 210 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2000) (permitting the 
State of California to execute a man without allowing him to participate in a 
sweat lodge ceremony, an American Indian equivalent of a last rites ceremony 
where the man claimed that through the ceremony he would be “purifying his 
body, mind, and soul, [making] amends for the people he harmed on Earth 
and [preparing] him to cross over from this world to the next”); Young v. 
Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding an Illinois prison 
regulation that restricted the wearing of yarmulkes); Kane v. Muir, 725 
N.E.2d 232, 233 (Mass. 2000) (finding that a prisoner’s complaint alleging 
confiscation of his rosary beads failed to state a cause of action). 
35 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). Claims brought under 
RFRA would be analyzed under a compelling interest test, as opposed to 
claims brought under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause in which 
prison administrators were given deference in their decision making that 
affected prisoners. Id. 
Congress set forth five separate findings regarding why it believed that 
religious freedom legislation was necessary. Congress found the following: 
(1) the framers of the constitution, recognizing free exercise of 
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection on the First 
Amendment to the Constitution; 
(2) laws neutral toward religion may burden religious exercise as 
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; 
(3) governments shall not substantially burden religious exercise 
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Court’s ruling in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources v. Smith, which held that a neutral, generally 
applicable Oregon law criminalizing the smoking of peyote was 
applicable to Native Americans who smoked peyote for religious 
observance.36 The legislation had two purposes that, in effect, 
circumvented the Smith decision.37 The first was to “restore the 
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and 
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of 
religion is substantially burdened.”38 The second stated purpose 
of RFRA was to “provide a claim or defense to persons whose 
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”39 
RFRA specifically provided that the “government shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability.”40 It further 
provided that the government may “substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person (1) is in the furtherance of 
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
                                                          
without compelling justification; 
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the 
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the 
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws 
neutral toward religion; and 
(5) that the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court 
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between 
religious liberty and competing government interests. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(1)-(5) (1993). 
36 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990); see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512 
(“Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court’s decision in 
Employment Div. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith.”). 
37 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b). 
38 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(1) (citation omitted); see also Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that a “showing merely of a 
rational relationship to some colorable state interest” would not justify 
substantial infringement of party’s constitutional right to free exercise of 
religion). 
39 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(2). 
40 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(a). 
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means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”41 
Claims brought under RFRA, unlike claims brought under the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, were subject to 
the rigorous constitutional standard of strict scrutiny and were 
examined under a compelling state interest and least restrictive 
means analysis.42 
The legislative history of RFRA indicates that, while the 
rights of prisoners were not explicitly mentioned in the text of the 
statute, the drafters of RFRA expressly intended for the 
legislation to apply to prisoners.43 A Senate report on RFRA 
under the heading of “Application of [RFRA] to Prisoners’ Free 
                                                          
41 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2). RFRA was enacted as a direct 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dep’t of 
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a neutral law of 
general applicability criminalizing the use of peyote should not withstand a 
free exercise challenge from a group of Native Americans who claimed that 
the use of peyote was an integral part of their religious practice). RFRA’s 
purpose was “to restore the compelling interests test . . . in all cases where the 
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-
1(b)(1). 
42 In creating RFRA, Congress provided another avenue that 
supplemented the First Amendment’s religious freedom protection. 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1. Claims brought under the First Amendment 
challenging the applicability of neutral laws that hindered religious freedom 
would be reviewed with a deferential slant to the states. See Smith, 494 U.S. 
872. A claim brought under RFRA, however, would clothe itself in the strict 
scrutiny that a compelling interest and least restrictive means analysis requires. 
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)-(2); see also City of Richmond v. Croson, 
488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a minority set aside program was 
unconstitutional because it failed to meet the strict scrutiny requirements to set 
aside a certain percentage of jobs on the basis of race). 
43 S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1892, 1899. The report also noted that those who drafted the Act did “not 
intend [it] to impose a standard that would exacerbate the difficult and 
complex challenges of operating the Nation’s prisons and jails in a safe and 
secure manner.” Id. The Committee was confident that the courts would be 
able to distinguish between claims based on a violation of religious rights and 
claims that made under the guise of religious rights but brought primarily to 
obtain special privileges. Id. at 1899-1900. The Senate Committee was 
“confident that the compelling interest standard set forth in [RFRA would] not 
place undue burdens on prison authorities.” Id. at 1900.  
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Exercise Claims” noted that, “as applied in the prison and jail 
context, the intent of [RFRA] is to restore the traditional 
protection afforded by prisoners to observe their religious rights 
which was weakened by the decision in O’Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz.”44 Congress was concerned that the religious exercise of 
prisoners was being unduly burdened by prison officials and 
administrators, and subsequently felt that the reasonableness test 
established in O’Lone was insufficient.45 It believed that prisoner 
claims should be addressed through “a more rigorous 
standard.”46 Furthermore, Congress was wary of “inadequately 
formulated prison regulations and policies grounded on mere 
speculation, exaggerated fears, or post hoc rationalizations,” and 
believed that such regulations and polices would not “suffice to 
meet the act’s requirements.”47 Moreover, when Congress was 
considering the merits of RFRA, an amendment was proposed 
that would have “prohibit[ed] the application of [RFRA] to an 
individual who is incarcerated in a Federal, State or local 
correctional, detention or penal facility.”48 The Senate 
overwhelmingly rejected this amendment.49 Thus, RFRA’s 
legislative history demonstrates Congress’ intent—for courts to 
                                                          
44 Id. at 1899. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1900. 
48 139 CONG. REC. S14461-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (remarks of Sen. 
Simpson). Senator Alan Simpson, in the Senate’s Judiciary Report regarding 
RFRA, expressed his displeasure and concern that the provisions of RFRA 
would apply with equal force to prisoners. See S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 8 
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899. Senator Simpson was 
specifically concerned about the effect RFRA would have on the increase in 
prison litigation because he believed that the least restrictive means test would 
allow “judges to establish their vision of how prisons should be run by forcing 
state or Federal government to allow increasingly burdensome forms of inmate 
contact.” 139 CONG. REC. S14461-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (remarks of 
Sen. Simpson). Simpson also was concerned that inmates may “create 
religions just to obtain special benefits or to avoid certain prison 
requirements.” Id. 
49 139 CONG. REC. S14461-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993). This proposed 
amendment was defeated by a large margin in the Senate (58-41). Id. 
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apply a strict scrutiny standard when reviewing actions brought 
by prisoners under RFRA.50 
Following RFRA’s enactment, several inmates brought free 
exercise suits, and several federal courts, applying strict scrutiny 
(a compelling state interest test coupled with a least restrictive 
means analysis), found that prison officials had placed a 
substantial burden on prisoners’ free exercise rights.51 The 
Second Circuit, in Jolly v. Coughlin, held that a New York 
prison’s mandatory tuberculosis testing program violated the 
religious rights of a Muslim inmate who refused to submit to the 
test for religious reasons.52 The court found that the policy of 
sequestering those who would not submit to the test was not 
narrowly tailored to the objective of quelling the spread of the 
disease.53 Jolly was one of the first cases that demonstrated the 
                                                          
50 Although Congress sought to protect prisoners’ religious rights through 
RFRA, and later, the RLUIPA, Congress has often restricted the rights of 
inmates in other areas. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-134. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) has hampered 
prisoners’ abilities to vindicate their rights through the federal courts. Id. 
Among other things, the PLRA has hampered prisoners’ ability to vindicate 
their rights through the federal courts, barring prisoners from bringing 
litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they could demonstrate a “prior 
showing of physical injury” and restricting their ability to proceed in forma 
pauperis. Id. However, when protecting prisoners’ religious liberties, 
Congress has gone to great lengths to insure the rights of prisoners. See supra 
Part I.A (detailing the importance of religious freedom in America, even 
between groups that span the political spectrum and accompanying discussion 
of RFRA’s legislative history and its application to prisoners). 
51 RFRA was effectively utilized by several prisoners as a method to 
enforce their religious rights. See, e.g., Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2d 
Cir. 1996); Jihad v. Wright, 929 F. Supp. 325, 331 (N.D. Ind. 1996). 
52 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996). 
53 Id. at 477, 479 (noting that, although the plaintiff was held in “medical 
keeplock” for not submitting to the tuberculosis test, he “was not in 
“respiratory isolation” from the general prison population, and therefore, the 
“isolation of the plaintiff does not and could not further the state’s compelling 
interest in protecting inmates and [Department of Corrections] staff from 
tuberculosis,” especially when in the absence of respiratory isolation, 
tuberculosis can be detected by “periodic submission to chest x-rays and 
sputum samples”). 
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effect that RFRA would have on prisons. The Jolly decision 
indicated that the courts would, in effect, have their say in 
dictating how prison officials should run their prisons.54 In this 
example, a court was undermining a law of general applicability 
relating to the health of a prison’s inmates, specifically by 
dictating how a prison should maintain itself in protecting the 
health of other inmates from a communicable disease.55 Many 
have criticized this decision as undue judicial interference with 
prison safety and security.56 It was a far cry from the deference 
afforded to prison administrators in O’Lone.57 Formerly, a court 
would have looked deferentially at a regulation enacted in the 
interest of prison health because the regulation was considered 
“reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”58 Under 
RFRA, however, some courts began to look harder at prison 
restrictions and the burden those restrictions placed on prisoners’ 
rights.59 Jolly indicated that RFRA could be utilized as a legal 
weapon in the hands of prisoners to enforce their religious 
rights.60 
Other courts followed the Second Circuit’s lead. In Jihad v. 
Wright,61 the Northern District of Indiana examined a prison 
regulation that required Muslim inmates who refused to submit to 
a tuberculosis (“TB”) test be placed on “restrictive medical 
separation”62 and “housed in very restricted conditions with TB 
positive inmates.”63 The court found that the prison’s policy was 
                                                          
54 Jolly, 76 F.3d 468. 
55 See id. 
56 See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S7991-02 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2000) 
(statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
57 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (noting that a 
prison regulation is considered valid if it is rationally related to a legitimate 
penological interest). 
58 O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349-350. 
59 See supra note 51. 
60 Jolly, 76 F.3d 468 (1996). 
61 929 F. Supp. 325, 331 (N.D. Ind. 1996). 
62 Id. at 327. 
63 Id. at 331. 
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not the least restrictive means of preventing the spread of TB.64 
In holding that, as a “less restrictive measure, officials could 
have treated [the plaintiff] as an inmate at risk of developing 
active tuberculosis by requiring him to submit to periodic chest x-
rays or sputum samples to determine if he had active TB and was 
therefore capable of infecting others,” the court, in essence was 
creating prison policy.65 
When Congress initially considered the language of the 
original RFRA, the term “substantially” in the substantial burden 
analysis was a last minute addition.66 In fact, the House had 
initially passed RFRA without the inclusion of the term 
“substantially.”67 Is there really a difference between a 
substantial burden standard and a burden or restriction standard 
when applied to religious free exercise claims? Although 
Congress adopted the substantial burden in its RFRA, the 
definition of what constitutes a substantial burden in the federal 
courts has differed greatly from circuit to circuit.68 
Under the few prison cases analyzed under RFRA, courts 
defined substantial burden differently. In Jolly v. Coughlin,69 the 
Second Circuit, in determining whether a law or regulation 
amounted to a “substantial burden” of an individual’s right to 
freely exercise his religion, held that its “scrutiny extends only to 
whether a claimant sincerely holds a particular belief and whether 
                                                          
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise 
Protection, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 698 (1999) (explaining that the term 
“substantially was added as a qualifier to the Federal RFRA as an eleventh 
hour revision by the Senate, possibly as a counter to pressures to exempt 
prisoners from RFRA coverage”). 
67 See 139 CONG. REC. H8714 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of 
Rep. Hyde). 
68 Durham, supra note 66, at 703 (noting the different interpretations of 
“substantial burden” by federal circuit courts). 
69 See Jolly, 76 F.3d at 476 (noting that infringement upon a prisoner’s 
sincerely held religious belief can constitute a substantial burden on one’s right 
to exercise his or her religion). 
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the belief is religious in nature.”70 The court went on to state that 
an “inquiry any more intrusive would be inconsistent with our 
nation’s fundamental commitment to individual religious 
freedom; thus courts are not permitted to ask whether a particular 
belief is appropriate or true—however unusual or unfamiliar the 
belief may be.”71 In the end, the Second Circuit considered “a 
substantial burden [to] exist[] where the state puts substantial 
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior or violate his 
beliefs.”72 Jolly’s substantial burden analysis was quite 
deferential to those bringing free exercise claims under the 
Federal RFRA. First, the court established a deferential standard 
in terms of what constitutes a religious belief.73 Second, Jolly 
stated that religious exercise had been substantially burdened 
when pressure had been utilized to encourage an individual to 
alter or modify his beliefs.74 
Other circuits were not as deferential to prisoners’ beliefs as 
the Second Circuit in Jolly. In McNair-Bey v. Bledsoe, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a prison regulation that forced an 
inmate to wear his Moorish Science Temple of America pin on 
the inside of his clothing rather than on the outside, did not 
constitute a substantial burden on that inmate’s right of free 
exercise.75 The Seventh Circuit noted: 
                                                          
70 Jolly, 76 F.3d at 476; see also Durham, supra note 66, at 695 (stating 
that courts “should not get involved in weighing centrality as a factor in 
eligibility for free exercise protection” and that “[a]llowing secular judges to 
make centrality assessments can lead to profoundly inappropriate results”). 
71 Jolly, 76 F.3d at 476; see also Durham, supra note 66, at 696 
(“[C]entrality analysis may simply not fit some traditions. Concern with 
centrality makes sense within religious traditions that have hierarchically 
structured norms, some of which are central . . . and others of which are more 
peripheral.”). 
72 Jolly, 76 F.3d at 477. 
73 Id. at 476. 
74 Id. at 477. 
75 See McNair-Bey v. Bledsoe, 1998 WL 879503, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 9, 
1998). The court in McNair-Bey held that the inmate was required to establish 
that “being able to wear his pin, displayed during religious celebrations and 
concealed all other times prevents from engaging in religious conduct or 
having a religious experience that his faith mandates.” Id. at * 2 (emphasis 
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[A] substantial burden on the free exercise of religion 
within the meaning of the RFRA is one that forces 
adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously 
motivated conduct or expression that manifests a central 
tenet of a person’s religious beliefs, or compels conduct 
or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.76 
Other circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, agreed that this more 
stringent standard should be used in order to determine if an 
individual’s exercise has been substantially burdened.77 For 
example, in Bryant v. Gomez, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the 
plaintiff’s RFRA claim alleging that he had been denied the 
opportunity to participate in full Pentecostal services that would 
have included speaking in tongues and laying one’s hands on 
others.78 The court dismissed this claim because the plaintiff 
failed to provide “any facts to show that the activities which he 
wish[ed] to engage in [were] mandated by the Pentecostal 
religion.”79 The Ninth Circuit interpreted the substantial burden 
standard to apply to prisoners quite literally. 
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis of a substantial burden on 
prisoners’ religious rights is similar to Seventh and Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis. In Diaz v. Collins the prisoner plaintiff, a 
“Native American religious practitioner,” brought an action 
under RFRA, claiming interference with his free exercise of 
religion because of prison regulations that restricted the length of 
his hair, the wearing of a headband, and the carrying of a 
                                                          
added). 
76 Id. (emphasis added). 
77 The Ninth Circuit agrees with the Seventh Circuit that the “interference 
[with religion] must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be 
substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is central to religious 
doctrine.” Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987); 
see also Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that, in order to show a free exercise violation under the substantial 
burden test, the inmate must prove that the law or regulation “prevents him 
from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience that his faith 
mandates”). 
78 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995). 
79 Id. at 949 (emphasis added). 
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medicine pouch.80 The court found that the plaintiff did not 
demonstrate that his religion was substantially burdened because 
the record “disclos[ed] that it is not necessarily a central tenet of 
[the plaintiff’s] religion that a medicine pouch or headband be 
worn at all times.”81 
In 1997, the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores 
declared RFRA unconstitutional.82 The Court determined that 
Congress, which had relied on its enforcement powers under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting RFRA, had 
exceeded its constitutional authority.83 In finding RFRA 
unconstitutional, the Court noted that Congress “has been given 
the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what 
constitutes a constitutional violation.”84 The Court stated that 
Congress’ power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is “remedial” and is not broad enough to encompass legislation 
that “makes a substantive change in the governing law.”85 In the 
absence of RFRA, therefore, the standard for evaluating an 
inmate’s free exercise claim against prison officials reverted back 
                                                          
80 114 F.3d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 
81 Id. 
82 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
83 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “Congress shall 
have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
84 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
85 Id. The Court stated that “RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed 
remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, 
or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears instead, to 
attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections.” Id. at 530. The 
Court went on to state more generally that “legislation which alters the 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the 
Clause.” Id. 
 Most circuit courts interpreting the Boerne decision have found that “the 
Supreme Court invalidated RFRA only as applied to state and local law” but 
continued to assume that RFRA “is constitutional as applied to federal law.” 
Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., Nos. 99-
55850, 56489, 55934, 56005, 2000 WL 1335890 at * 9 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
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to the “legitimate penological interest” or rational basis test 
articulated in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.86 
II. STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACTS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO 
PRISONERS’ RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ARE STATE RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM ACTS THE LAST HOPE FOR HEIGHTENED RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM PROTECTION FOR INMATES? 
After Boerne pronounced RFRA unconstitutional, Congress 
scrambled to enact similar legislation with the purpose of passing 
the Supreme Court’s constitutional scrutiny.87 Congress first 
attempted to restore the compelling interest standard to laws that 
burdened an individual’s free exercise of religion through the 
Religious Liberty Protection Act (“RLPA”).88 However, RLPA 
did not gain the support needed to pass both houses of Congress, 
mainly because many believed it would impede the effectiveness 
of other civil rights legislation (the law offered a blanket 
exception for religious freedom with respect to laws of general 
                                                          
86 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabbaz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). Since the Boerne 
Court found that RFRA “contradict[ed] vital principles necessary to maintain 
separation of powers and the federal balance,” the Court held that the Act, as 
applied to the states, was unconstitutional. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
 Reversion back to O’Lone’s deferential standard forced courts to make 
decisions that, among other things, prevented death row inmates from taking 
their Bibles to Bible study and allowed Texas school children to be disciplined 
for wearing rosary beads that were claimed by the school to be gang symbols. 
In Support of H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (July 14, 1998) (statement of Pat Nolan, President, 
Justice Fellowship). 
87 Less than a year after the Boerne decision, Congress was debating the 
constitutionality of the Religious Liberty Protection Act. See, e.g., Hearing on 
H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: House Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (June 16, 
1998) (testimony of Douglas Laycock, University of Texas Law School). The 
Religious Liberty Protection Act would essentially overturn the Smith decision 
and return RFRA’s strict scrutiny test to laws and regulations that interfered 
with an individual’s free exercise of religion. See 145 CONG. REC. H5580-02 
(daily ed. July 15, 1999) (remarks of Rep. Myrick). 
88 H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998). 
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applicability).89 Other concerns arose from Congress’ enactment 
of the legislation through its Commerce Clause powers.90 
                                                          
89 RLPA was proposed in response to the Boerne ruling. Senator Reid 
stated the following with respect to its enactment: 
[A] strict scrutiny standard [applies] to the actions of state and local 
governments with respect to religious exercise, but attempt[s] to draw 
its authority from Congressional powers to attach conditions to 
federal funding programs and to regulate commerce. While the 
companion measure passed the House of Representatives 
overwhelmingly in July 1999, the legislation stalled in the Senate 
when legitimate concerns were raised that RLPA, as drafted, would 
supersede certain civil rights, particularly in areas relating to 
employment and housing. Theses concerns were most troubling to the 
gay and lesbian community. 
[D]iscrimination based on race, national origin, and to a lesser 
certainty, gender, would have been protected, regardless of RLPA, 
because the courts have recognized that preventing such 
discrimination as a sufficient enough compelling government interest 
to overcome the strict scrutiny standard that RLPA would apply to 
religious exercise. Sexual orientation and disability discrimination, 
however, have not been afforded this high level of protection. 
146 CONG. REC. S. 7774-01 at S7778 (remarks of Sen. Reid) (citation 
omitted). See Cary McMullen, Canady’s Religion Bill on its Way, LAKELAND 
LEDGER, Aug. 19, 2000, at D1 (noting that the RLPA, introduced in 1998, 
“got lost” in President Clinton’s impeachment proceedings, and the same bill 
introduced in 1999 passed the House but did not gain support in the Senate, 
mainly because “gay rights supporters became skittish that [RLPA] might 
allow religious persons to deny gays housing or employment on the grounds of 
conscience”). Thus, there was concern that gays and the disabled, groups that 
are afforded barely any constitutional protection, would suffer at the expense 
of creating a compelling interest test for all laws that interfered with religion. 
See 146 CONG. REC. S. 7774-01 at S7778 (remarks of Sen. Reid supporting 
RLUIPA); see also Cary McMullen, Canady’s Religion Bill on its Way, 
LAKELAND LEDGER, Aug. 19, 2000, at D1. 
90  Hearing on H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: 
House Subcomm. on the Constitution of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong. (1998) (testimony of Michael P. Farris, Esq., Founder and President of 
the Home School Legal Defense Association). 
Quite simply, religion is not commerce. If RLPA is enacted, 
Christians and other people of faith will not be able to seek legal 
protection for [their] worship simply because it is commanded by 
God. Instead we will be required to prove in court that our religion is 
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In the period between the Boerne decision and the recent 
enactment of the RLUIPA, the eyes of prisoners turned to the 
states to protect their religious rights. While federal courts 
reverted back to the deferential standard for free exercise claims 
adopted in O’Lone,91 states remained free to do more in the way 
of protecting religious liberties of its citizens.92 In fact, even after 
the passage of RLUIPA, the importance of state RFRAs cannot 
be underestimated, especially in light of the fact that there has 
been speculation that the Supreme Court may find RLUIPA 
unconstitutional.93 
A.  State RFRAs and the Substantial Burden Requirement: Do 
Alabama, Connecticut, New Mexico and Rhode Island 
Make Things Easier for Prisoners? 
Most of the states that have passed state RFRAs in response 
to Boerne have done so with language almost identical to that of 
the Federal RFRA.94 However, Alabama, Connecticut, New 
                                                          
interstate commercial activity. 
Id. 
91 See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabbaz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); see also 
Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “[a]n inmate 
is . . . entitled to a reasonable accommodation of his religious beliefs”); 
Reynolds v. Goord, 103 F. Supp. 2d 316, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that 
the working “standard of review for a prison regulation that impinges on an 
inmate’s constitutional rights is . . . whether a prison regulation is ‘valid if it 
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests’”) (citing Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). 
92 The deferential legitimate penological interest standard for prisoners’ 
free exercise claims was quickly reapplied after the passage of RFRA. See, 
e.g., Jackson, 196 F.3d at 320. 
93 See infra Part II.D. 
94 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03; 
IDAHO CODE § 73-402; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2000); S.C. 
CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-40, 24-27-600; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 110.003. 
These states all enacted RFRAs providing that the government shall not 
“substantially burden” a person’s exercise of religion, even “if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability.” The state RFRAs went on to 
adopt the notion that if a government were to burden an individual’s free 
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Mexico and Rhode Island passed RFRAs with burden standards 
that differed from the Federal RFRA.95 These states have 
imposed a burden less than the “substantial burden” necessary to 
sustain a Federal RFRA claim. Both Rhode Island and New 
Mexico, instead of adopting the Federal RFRA’s standard 
creating an action for any law that acts as a “substantial burden” 
on a person’s exercise of religion, opted to apply a compelling 
interest standard to any “restriction” placed on a person’s free 
exercise of religion.96 Alabama and Connecticut have also 
adopted a less rigorous standard than the federal one by requiring 
only that the regulation “burden” the free exercise of religion.97 
At face value, it appears that Alabama, Connecticut, New 
Mexico and Rhode Island have made it easier for their citizens to 
bring free exercise claims.98 While they have at least imposed 
less burdensome standards, however, the question remains 
whether the “burden” or “restriction” standard, as opposed to the 
“substantial burden” standard, will allow more prisoners to bring 
their free exercise claims.99 The prospects of the religious 
                                                          
exercise of religion, it must demonstrate that the application of the burden is a 
“compelling governmental interest” and that the burden is “the least restrictive 
means” of furthering that compelling state interest. 
95 ALA. CONST. amend. § 622 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
571b (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
42-80.1-3 (1993). 
96 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3. 
97 See ALA. CONST. amend. § 622 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
52-571b (2000). 
98 These states are using their authority to guarantee more rights to the 
individual than the Federal Constitution allows. States have often provided 
more rights than the Federal Constitution. For example, in People v. Class, 
the New York Court of Appeals held that the New York Constitution provided 
protection from an unreasonable police intrusion into the interior of an 
automobile, where the Supreme Court had found no protection under the 
Federal Constitution. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); People v. 
Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431 (1986). 
99 Although Alabama, Connecticut, New Mexico and Rhode Island have 
adopted a standard that on its face appears to be less restrictive than the 
substantial burden standard, these statutes include no definitions or guidelines 
regarding what may constitute a “restriction” or a “burden.” See ALA. 
CONST. amend. § 622 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (2000); 
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freedom legislation adopted in these four states are encouraging 
to prisoners bringing free exercise claims in theory, but may not 
prove to be as valuable in practice. 
In consciously removing the “substantial” from their religious 
protection burden standards, Alabama, Connecticut, New Mexico 
and Rhode Island may succeed in hearing the claims of prisoner 
plaintiffs where the federal courts failed.100 Under a mere burden 
or restriction standard, prisoners may have a greater chance of 
getting their free exercise claims into court and of vindicating 
their religious rights. The problem, however, is that none of 
these four states define what a “burden” or “restriction” is under 
their respective statutes nor explain how those terms should be 
interpreted in the context of prisons.101 
It appears as if only one state has even made a conscious 
attempt to clear up the confusion wrought by the “substantial 
burden” standard applied under the Federal RFRA. Idaho, in its 
religious freedom legislation, provides that the term 
“substantially burden is intended solely to ensure that this chapter 
is not triggered by trivial, technical or de minimis infractions.”102
 This provision in the Idaho RFRA attempts to delineate just 
how broadly its substantial burden standard is to apply. However, 
while it attempts to offer judges a guideline, the vagueness of its 
substantial burden standard may have no actual effect on the way 
judges apply the standard. Each judge may bring to the bench her 
own value judgments regarding what constitutes “trivial, 
technical or de minimis infractions.”103 This notion is especially 
true with religious ideologies, where one man’s trivial infraction 
is another’s serious deprivation. Thus, while Idaho’s attempt to 
clarify the substantial burden standard is a noble one, judges still 
                                                          
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3 
(1993). 
100 See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the various interpretations of 
substantial burden applied by several federal courts in analyzing prisoners’ 
claims under RFRA. 
101 See supra note 99 (noting that none of the four states define “burden” 
or “restriction”). 
102 IDAHO CODE § 73-402(5) (2000). 
103 Id. 
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retain authority to determine what is or is not a “trivial, technical 
or de minimis infraction,” and that standard has the potential to 
differ from judge to judge.104 
It appears as if inmates in Alabama, Connecticut, New 
Mexico and Rhode Island will still have to take their chances, 
despite the imposition of a standard that on its face appears to be 
less stringent than the federal substantial burden standard.105 The 
federal analysis indicates that the interpretation of what 
constitutes a substantial burden often depends on the notion of the 
reviewing court. Therefore, a state RFRA providing that a 
person’s religious rights cannot be “substantially burdened” may 
not, in theory, be a more rigorous standard than a state RFRA 
that applies a “burden” standard.106 Thus, the responsibility in 
interpretation rests with the courts of the states that have 
established RFRAs; if the experience of the federal courts is any 
indication, it may be difficult for state courts to apply these 
different burden standards with any inkling of consistency. 
B.  State RFRAs and Explicit Statutory Provisions Regarding 
the Religious Rights of Prisoners 
Of the states that have adopted RFRAs, only South Carolina’s 
legislation explicitly notes its application to prisoners.107 The 
South Carolina provision reads: 
A state or local correctional facility’s regulation must be 
considered in furtherance of a compelling state interest if 
the facility demonstrates that the religious activity sought 
to be engaged by a prisoner is (1) presumptively 
dangerous to the health or safety of the prisoner; or (2) 
                                                          
104 Id. 
105 ALA. CONST. amend. § 622 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
571b (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-3 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
42-80.1-3 (1993). 
106 See supra Part I.B and accompanying discussion of the different 
interpretations of RFRA as applied to prisoners. 
107 S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-45 (“[T]his chapter does not affect the 
application of and must be complied with Chapter 27 of Title 24 concerning 
inmate litigation.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500. 
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poses a direct threat to the health, safety, or security of 
other prisoners, correctional staff, or the public.108 
This statute, moreover, provides that a “state or local 
correctional facility regulation may not be considered the ‘least 
restrictive means’ of furthering a compelling state interest if a 
reasonable accommodation can be made to protect the safety to 
security of prisoners, correctional staff or the public.”109 
The lines drawn by the South Carolina legislature may reduce 
the amount of protection afforded to prisoners under its RFRA. 
For example, take the facts of Jolly v. Coughlin,110 but imagine 
that the case was brought in a South Carolina state court. Jolly 
dealt with the clashing of a prisoner’s religious rights against 
prison officials’ desire to quell tuberculosis, a communicable 
disease.111 The court found for the prisoner plaintiff despite the 
fact that prison officials were attempting control tuberculosis.112 
Under the South Carolina statute, the courts are instructed to find 
a compelling state interest when the religious activity sought to 
be protected may “pose a direct threat to the health, safety or 
security of other prisoners, correctional staff or the public.”113 
Obviously, one’s refusal to submit to a tuberculosis test because 
it violates the tenets of one’s religion qualifies as something that 
may “pose a direct threat to the health, safety or security of other 
prisoners [or] correctional staff.”114 However, the inquiry does 
                                                          
108 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(A)(1)(2). This statute is made expressly 
applicable to South Carolina’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act by S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 1-32-45. 
109 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(B) (emphasis added). This reasonable 
accommodation standard was the standard implied by many of the federal 
courts after the Federal RFRA had been decided and the courts went back to 
applying a more deferential standard to prison officials. See Jackson v. Mann, 
196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A]n inmate is only entitled to a 
reasonable accommodation of his religious beliefs.”) (emphasis added). 
110 76 F.3d 468 (1996). 
111 Id.; see also supra notes 52-55, 69-74 (discussing Jolly in greater 
detail). 
112 Jolly, 76 F.3d at 468. 
113 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500. 
114 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(A)(1). 
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not end there. In South Carolina, the least restrictive means 
analysis is buttressed by a deferential “reasonable 
accommodation” standard.115 In other words, if it would take 
anything more than a “reasonable accommodation” for a prison 
to change its regulation, the regulation would survive the strict 
scrutiny of the RFRA.116 Thus, if the facts of Jolly were applied 
to a case arising in a South Carolina state court, there is a very 
good chance the court could determine that a prison’s overhaul of 
its entire tuberculosis policy does not, in fact, constitute a 
“reasonable accommodation.”117 The Federal RFRA, on the other 
hand, does not distinguish its least restrictive means analysis 
between non-incarcerated individuals and prisoners.118 Thus, 
although South Carolina’s “reasonable accommodation” standard 
has not been defined by the courts, one could assume that, 
because the standard has been distinguished from a non-
incarcerated individual’s rights under its RFRA, it would work to 
limit the success of prisoners’ free exercise claims by providing 
more leeway and deference to prison officials.119 
A “reasonable accommodation” standard seems to mirror 
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz and its “legitimate penological 
interest” standard in terms of the deference afforded to prison 
officials.120 Non-incarcerated individuals are not burdened by this 
deferential standard; it applies only to prisoners.121 Presumably, 
                                                          
115 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(B). 
116 Id. 
117 Jolly’s least restrictive means analysis offered alternatives to the 
prison’s medical keeplock program. Jolly, 75 F.3d at 479. The court 
concluded that its suggested accommodations “represent[] a less restrictive 
alternative, and the defendants are therefore required to pursue it.” Id. 
118 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1. 
119 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(A)(1). 
120 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987). The 
legitimate penological interest standard articulated in O’Lone was basically a 
rational basis type test under which the courts were not delving deeply into 
alternatives of prison administration as long as prison officials could justify the 
regulation as being related to a legitimate penological interest. Id. 
121 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(B), supra note 109 (discussing the 
deferential “reasonable accommodation” standard). 
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when a non-incarcerated individual brings a claim under South 
Carolina’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a court would 
apply a tougher standard of alternatives than the “reasonable 
accommodation” standard. In all probability, South Carolina 
lowered the bar out of fear that the accommodation of certain 
religious practices may undermine the security and safety of the 
prison system.122 Therefore, while prisoners are provided with an 
extra layer of religious protection under RFRA, that protection 
may not prove, when applied, to be very effective as a result of 
South Carolina’s potential limitation requiring prison officials to 
provide alternative measures to protect prisoners’ free exercise. 
C. The Practical and Theoretical Ineffectiveness of State 
RFRAs 
While state RFRAs may be the most practical solution to 
protecting prisoners’ religious freedoms in the wake of Boerne, 
they have not accomplished this goal. Regardless of the 
individual protections provided by state RFRAs, this legislation 
has, until now, proven to be both practically and even 
theoretically defective in addressing prisoners’ free exercise 
concerns. This appears to be the case because, even though some 
of these state RFRAs have been on the books for almost three 
years, no prisoner has successfully litigated under the nine state 
RFRAs currently in existence. The theoretical defect of state 
RFRAs and their application to the rights of inmates arises 
because prisoners do not possess the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to travel.123 Thus, while citizens of the United States who 
wish to take advantage of more stringent religious protection laws 
are free to move from state to state, prisoners are left to rely on 
whether the state that incarcerates them (or, the state in which 
they are incarcerated) has enacted religious freedom legislation. 
                                                          
122 S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-500(A)(1). 
123 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510-511 (1999) (holding that 
“[c]itizens of the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right to choose 
to be citizens of the state wherein they reside”). 
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1.  The Practical Problem: The Lack of Litigation Under State 
RFRAs 
While the Federal RFRA provided an ample forum for 
prisoners to bring their free exercise claims, the state RFRAs do 
not yet appear to have the same success in bringing inmates into 
court.124 Prisoners brought over 250 free exercise claims in the 
federal courts when the Federal RFRA applied to the states.125 
Contrastingly, in the three years since Boerne invalidated the 
federal RFRA and states began enacting their own RFRAs, 
virtually no recorded prisoner free exercise claims have been 
brought in reliance on a state RFRA.126 The only recorded cases 
in which plaintiffs have brought free exercise claims under state 
RFRAs have been cases in which religious institutions have 
challenged a state or local zoning authority’s decision to deny a 
building permit for a religious institution.127 Thus far, prisoners 
have not benefited from the existence of state RFRAs, even in 
those states that apply the less restrictive burden standard.128 
It is quite puzzling that there have been no recorded prisoner 
free exercise claims under state RFRAs. Granted, the pool of 
petitioners filing under state RFRAs has decreased in relation to 
                                                          
124 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing litigation brought 
under the Federal RFRA). 
125 See 146 CONG. REC. S7991-02 (Sept. 5, 2000) (remarks of Sen. 
Thurmond). 
126 Even the three states whose RFRAs run on a lesser standard than the 
“substantial burden” standard have not had any documented prisoner free 
exercise litigation. 
127 See, e.g., First Baptist Church of Perrine v. Miami-Dade County, 768 
So. 2d 1114 (Fl. Dist Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the church’s application for 
special exceptions and non-use variances to expand school, and finding no 
violation Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act); First Church of 
Christ, Scientist v. Historic Dist. Comm’n, 737 A.2d 989 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1999) (dismissing plaintiff’s action against defendant who had denied his 
application for a certificate of appropriateness to allow the installation of vinyl 
siding on its church building). 
128 The lack of recorded cases reflecting prisoners’ use of these statutes is 
indicative that prisoners have not yet taken advantage of their provisions. If 
claims have been brought, those claims have not generated opinions. 
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the amount of those who had filed under the Federal RFRA.129 
This decrease, however, cannot explain why there have been 
absolutely no recorded inmate free exercise claims under state 
RFRAs. The fact that there are none, however, has shown that 
the practical effect of state RFRAs has not lived up to the 
possibilities that prisoners may have hoped for when they were 
enacted. 
2.  The Theoretical Problem: State RFRAs are Ineffective as 
Applied to Prisoners Because Prisoners Do Not Retain a Right to 
Travel 
It has long been a tenet in constitutional law that if a citizen 
opposes a certain law or regulation of the state in which he lives, 
that person has the right to move to another state and take 
advantage of its laws.130 Thus for example, if an individual lives 
in New Jersey, a state where there is no state RFRA, and she 
seeks more protection of her religious freedoms, she can pack up 
and move to Idaho, a state that has enacted its own RFRA.131 The 
Supreme Court has endorsed the notion that an individual has the 
right to travel, and that same individual who elects to change her 
state residency avails herself of the laws and privileges of the 
state she moves to.132 A state is free to enact legislation for the 
benefit of its citizens.133 If individuals from other states support 
                                                          
129 Being a federal law, the RFRA provided a forum for any inmate in the 
country to contest a prison regulation he or she believed violated free exercise 
of religion rights. See 42 U.S.C.A. 2000bb-1. In terms of the number of 
people it effects, state RFRAs are obviously more narrow in scope because 
only prisoners living in that state can take advantage of the state religious 
protections laws. 
130 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510-511 (1999) (holding that 
“[c]itizens of the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right to choose 
to be citizens of the state wherein they reside”). The Court found this right to 
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such legislation, they are free to move there.134 Likewise, 
individuals who live in that state and are opposed to the 
legislation in question, remain free to move out of that state and 
avail themselves of the laws of another state.135 
In the context of prisons, however, the right to travel has no 
application.136 Under state RFRAs, prisoners are forced to have 
their religious freedoms evaluated depending on where they are 
incarcerated. Federal prisoners are especially affected because 
they are often transferred to a state where they did not commit 
the crime for which they are incarcerated. Prisoners may be 
forced to live in states where there is no legislation applying a 
compelling interest to a burden on their free exercise of religion. 
Thus, state RFRAs are ineffective when applied in the prison 
context because prisoners, unlike non-incarcerated individuals, 
have absolutely no opportunity to avail themselves of the laws of 
other states. Such an inconsistency supports the notion that a 
uniform federal standard is necessary in order to provide some 
consistency to inmate free exercise protection. 
D. The Importance of State RFRAs Despite the Enactment of 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act 
State RFRAs may still remain important despite the recent 
passage of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”).137 The RLUIPA has restored strict 
scrutiny to laws or regulations that “impose a substantial burden 
on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an 
institution” and land use regulations that “impose a substantial 
                                                          
134 Id at 511. The Court noted that “the States . . . do not have any right 
to select their citizens.” Id. 
135 Id. 
136 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (noting that a prisoner 
retains only those privileges and immunities “that are not inconsistent with his 
status as a prisoner”). 
137 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000) (protecting the religious exercise of 
institutionalized persons); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(a)(1) (protecting land use as 
religious exercise). 
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burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious 
assembly, or institution.”138 State RFRAs, especially in the four 
states with a “burden” standard, remain vitally important because 
of the raging debate regarding the constitutionality of the 
RLUIPA.139 Many were astounded by the speed in which the 
legislation passed both houses of Congress, especially in light of 
the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court regarding the 
constitutionality of such legislation in City of Boerne v. Flores.140 
As a result of how quickly it was passed, some critics of the 
legislation believe that more congressional hearings are necessary 
in order to determine whether RLUIPA would pass the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional scrutiny.141 Many are skeptical whether the 
extensive hearings that surrounded both the Federal RFRA and 
RLUIPA would quell the claims that RLUIPA was not adequately 
debated in Congress.142 The call for more extensive debate is 
essentially based on the inherent problems in enacting federal 
legislation mandating that religion retain a certain federal 
privilege against state and local zoning and prison regulations that 
are considered generally applicable laws.143 These problems were 
                                                          
138 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
139 After the Boerne decision, Congress had to confront the challenge of 
passing religious freedom legislation without exceeding its powers under the 
Constitution. 
140 See David W. Dunlap, God, Caesar and Zoning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
27, 2000, § 11, at 1 (noting that “[w]ith unanimity and astonishing speed—16 
minutes elapsed from introduction to passage in the House of 
Representatives—Congress has acted to exempt religious institutions from 
land-use rules that excessively burden religious exercise”). 
141 See, e.g., Editorial, Religion and Its Landmarks, N.Y. TIMES, July 
27, 2000, at A24 (stating that the “first responsibility of Congress is to slow 
things down and allow for hearings on a complicated matter that has received 
not nearly enough public debate about its potential consequences”). 
142 See, e.g., Peg Breen, President, New York Landmarks Conservancy, 
Letter to the Editor: The Landmarks Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2000, at A32. 
“[W]hile there were prior hearings on a much broader version of this bill 
[referencing RLPA], there has never been a fair representation of witnesses 
questioning the bill’s constitutionality, necessity and effect. Unfortunately, the 
bill has since passed—without hearings and without debate.” Id. 
143 Most of the criticism surrounding RLUIPA has fallen on the provision 
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addressed in City of Boerne, and Congress is attempting to 
circumvent them now.144 Due to the likelihood that RLUIPA will 
not withstand the scrutiny of the courts, state RFRAs remain 
important tools, if utilized, to protect religious liberties of 
prisoners.145 
Congress enacted RLUIPA under its section 5 enforcement 
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, its Interstate 
Commerce powers and its Spending Clause powers.146 It is well 
known, especially after Boerne, that the Supreme Court found 
constitutional problems in Congress’ enactment of legislation that 
provides religious groups and individuals special privileges 
against laws of general applicability.147 Constitutional scholars 
believe that the Supreme Court in Boerne already reprimanded 
Congress with respect to how Congress used its powers under the 
Fourteenth Amendment in its attempt to pass religious freedom 
legislation.148 In order for Congress to enact legislation under 
                                                          
affecting land use regulations, not the provision that gives greater rights to 
prisoners to challenge state and local regulations. See, e.g., Marci A. 
Hamilton, When Churches Are Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2000, at A25 
(detailing the negative effects of excluding religious groups from land use and 
zoning ordinances); Juan Otero, Congress Moves to Federalize Local Land 
Use Control; Measure Passes Under Guise of Religious Liberty, NATIONS 
CITIES WKLY, Aug. 7, 2000, at 1 (stating that “simply put, the bill would 
allow certain groups to disregard the rules as they are applied to everyone 
else, regardless of the will of the community itself”). 
144 Hamilton, supra note 143, at A25. 
145 Hamilton, supra note 143, at A25 (claiming that RLUIPA is “unlikely 
to survive a constitutional challenge”); Otero, supra note 143, at 1 (pointing 
out the “serious legal flaws” of the approved measure). 
146 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (enforcement powers); U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8(3) (Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(1) (spending 
powers). See also 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (July 27, 2000) (Exhibit 
1: Need for Legislation) (noting that Congress’ basis for its congressional 
authority to enact RLUIPA rests on the Spending Clause, the Commerce 
Clause and its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the 
Constitution). 
147 See Boerne, supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the 
unconstitutionality of the RFRA). 
148 See Boerne, supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the 
unconstitutionality of the RFRA). 
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section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “there must be a pattern 
of widespread and persisting constitutional violations by the states 
and the legislative solution must be proportional and congruent to 
those violations.”149 The principal flaw of Congress’ enactment of 
RLUIPA under Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment powers is the 
claim that “supporters of RLUIPA have cobbled together a short 
string of anecdotes that do not illustrate constitutional violations, 
and certainly do not illustrate widespread and persisting 
constitutional violations by the states.”150 In fact, some find 
similarities to Boerne, and have argued that there has been “no 
good evidence of widespread and persisting discrimination 
against churches.”151 Simply put, constitutional scholars view 
Congress’ enactment of RLUIPA as almost directly disobeying 
the Supreme Court’s warnings, which were issued in Boerne, 
regarding the use of Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment powers.152 
Knowing that the Court took issue with Congress’ enactment of 
religious freedom legislation under its section 5 Enforcement 
Powers, Congress enacted RLUIPA under two of its other 
constitutional powers: its power to regulate interstate commerce 
and its spending powers. 
However, the enactment of this legislation under these powers 
                                                          
149 Letter from Marci A. Hamilton to the United States Senate, July 24, 
2000, at 1, available at http://www.marcihamilton.com/rlpa/rluipa/letter.htm 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Letter from Hamilton to the Senate]. 
150 Id. Hamilton insisted that in almost all of the instances where religious 
institutions had to bear the burden of a land use restriction, there was no proof 
that the religious institution was the target of religious discrimination. Id. 
Hamilton stated: 
[It is] telling that no land use official, city official, organization 
representing cities or counties, or historical preservation organization 
has been permitted to testify on religious liberty issues. Instead the 
hearings on the Religious Liberty Protection Act were stacked with 
religious interests to the exclusion of those with the most knowledge 
about land use practices. 
Id. 
151 Id. 
152 See Boerne, supra note 82 (noting restrictions on Congress’ 
enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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has also generated criticism from constitutional critics.153 
Specifically, those critics believe that the legislation will not 
survive a challenge to its constitutionality.154 Recently, the 
current Supreme Court restricted Congress’ power to enact 
legislation under its Commerce Clause powers in its ever-
narrowing interpretation of the federalism doctrine.155 
Constitutional legislation under the Commerce Clause must 
“substantially affect” interstate commerce.156 Several critics of 
RLUIPA are quite confident that the provisions of RLUIPA, on 
their face, would fail the Commerce Clause’s “substantially 
affects” test.157 Section 2 of RLUIPA provides in part, that strict 
scrutiny should be given to land use and prison regulations that 
only “affect” interstate commerce.158 Since it relies on 
                                                          
153 See Otero, supra note 143, at 2; Letter from Hamilton to the Senate, 
supra note 149, at 1; Hearings on H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty 
Protections Act: Before House Subcomm. on the Constitution of House Comm. 
of the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Michael P. Farris, 
expressing his concerns about using the Commerce Clause to pass religious 
legislation). 
154 See Otero, supra note 143, at 2; Letter from Hamilton to the Senate, 
supra note 149, at 1; Hearings on H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty 
Protections Act: Before House Subcomm. on the Constitution of House Comm. 
of the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Michael P. Farris, 
expressing his concerns about using the Commerce Clause to pass religious 
legislation). 
155 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the 
Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with authority to enact civil 
remedies of the Violence Against Women Act because the activities protected 
in the act did not “substantially affect” interstate commerce); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that since possession of a gun in a 
school zone did not “substantially affect” interstate commerce, the Gun Free 
School Zone Act was an unconstitutional use of power under the Commerce 
Clause). 
156 See supra note 155 (indicating the narrow interpretation of what 
“substantially affects” interstate commerce). 
157 See Otero, supra note 143, at 2; Letter from Hamilton to the Senate, 
supra note 149, at 1. 
158 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(2)(B) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc1(b)(2) (2000) 
(stating that courts shall use strict scrutiny when a “substantial burden affects 
[interstate commerce]”). 
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regulations that only “affect” interstate commerce, the Court is 
likely to find that Congress’ enactment of RLUIPA under its 
Commerce Clause powers is an unconstitutional use of its 
powers. Other critics of the Commerce Clause are disconcerted 
that Congress has linked the flow of commerce to religion.159 
Critics have also questioned Congress’ use of its spending 
powers to enact this legislation.160 Under the Spending Clause, 
there must be a “nexus” between the activity regulated and the 
spending condition that Congress imposes.161 Under RLUIPA, 
strict scrutiny will apply when a “substantial burden is imposed 
in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance, 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”162 
Therefore, any entity under RLUIPA that receives federal 
funding (and this includes most prisons), and adopts a regulation 
that may substantially burden religious land use or an 
institutionalized person’s free exercise, will be subject to strict 
scrutiny. Critics of Congress’ use of the spending power to enact 
RLUIPA believe that the flaw lies in the lack of a focused nexus 
between the activity being regulated and the spending condition 
being imposed.163 If Congress’ use of its spending powers under 
RLUIPA is deemed to be over-inclusive and lack a central nexus 
to its regulation, it will fail to survive a constitutional challenge. 
Thus, if the Supreme Court invalidates RLUIPA, state 
RFRAs will then be back in the religious freedom spotlight. Even 
                                                          
159  Hearings on H.R. 4019, the Religious Liberty Protections Act: Before 
House Subcomm. on the Constitution of House Comm. of the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong. (1998), supra note 153 (testimony of Michael P. Farris, expressing his 
concerns about using the Commerce Clause to pass religious legislation, 
especially since Congress has linked the idea of religious protection and God 
with its power to regulate commerce, generally an economic power). 
160 See Letter from Hamilton to the Senate, supra note 149, at 1 (“There 
is no nexus in existence that can explain how the federal government can 
burden every program touched by federal money . . . with such a burdensome 
level of scrutiny and the surefire likelihood of litigation.”). 
161 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968). 
162 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). 
163 See Otero, supra note 143, at 2; Letter from Hamilton to the Senate, 
supra note 149, at 1. 
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if RLUIPA does pass a constitutional challenge, state RFRAs 
may still have an important place in the protection of religious 
freedoms of prisoners. If for example an inmate fails to prevail 
on her RLUIPA claim because she has not proven that her 
religion has been “substantially” burdened, she may still have a 
claim in the state courts of Alabama, Connecticut, New Mexico 
or Rhode Island as the standard of the burden is a lower one.164 
Even the states that do have a substantial burden standard provide 
another forum for prisoners to test their luck to see how that 
standard will be interpreted.165 This analysis depends on how the 
different state courts decide what, in fact, constitutes either a 
burden or a substantial burden. 
CONCLUSION 
RLUIPA has received vocal criticism regarding both its 
purpose and constitutionality. Many constitutional scholars are 
eagerly awaiting the day when the Supreme Court will strike 
down the provisions of RLUIPA.166 Since the constitutionality of 
RLUIPA is an issue that the Court is likely to address, the 
importance of state RFRAs looms large. If the Court invalidates 
RLUIPA, it will strike a near fatal blow to Congress’ hopes to 
enact religious freedom legislation that provides significantly 
more protection than the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause. Congress has repeatedly attempted to carve out religious 
freedom legislation that will satisfy the Supreme Court’s 
                                                          
164 See supra Part II.B (discussing the lower “burden” and “restriction” 
standards of Alabama, Connecticut, New Mexico and Rhode Island). 
165 The other states’ RFRAs that work off of a “substantial burden” 
standard have not yet articulated how that standard should be applied to 
prisoners. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
761.03; IDAHO CODE § 73-402; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15; S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 1-32-40; S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40, 24-27-600; TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. § 110.003. Theoretically, they could provide a less demanding 
standard than the one adopted under the RLUIPA. 
166 See supra Part II.D and accompanying discussion of the constitutional 
flaws of the RLUIPA. 
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scrutiny.167 If RLUIPA is struck down, the federal government 
may be out of options to enact this type of legislation. 
If they indeed run out of options to enact religious freedom 
legislation, the responsibility of providing greater protection for 
religious liberties will fall to the states. With respect to prisoners, 
states will have free reign regarding how much protection they 
want to offer the inmates of their respective states. Some states 
have advertently chosen to adopt a lesser burden standard in their 
RFRAs in order to get the religious freedoms claims of inmates 
into court.168 Although these state courts have not actually defined 
what that burden standard is, the fact that they have adopted a 
lesser burden standard indicates that they want to provide more 
religious protection to their prisoners.169 Only the test of time and 
the result of litigation will prove what this burden standard really 
is in practice. State religious freedom acts do matter and may be 
a prisoner’s only option if RLUIPA is found unconstitutional. 
Although the states have been somewhat ineffective in addressing 
the religious rights of prisoners, they may be a prisoner’s last 
hope in preserving more religious protection than the federal 
government will offer. And they may even prove to be effective 
if they continue to receive support in state legislatures and are 
ultimately drafted carefully enough to avoid the unclear 
interpretations that accompanied the Federal RFRA. 
 
                                                          
167 See supra notes 17, 87. 
168 See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (regarding the burden 
standard applied in Alabama, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Mexico). 
169 See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (regarding the burden 
standard applied in Alabama, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Mexico). 
